Abstract
1.
Definitions: Teleology, eschatology, utopia
In this essay I will be reflecting on the teleology o f literature from the vantage point o f the Christian tradition. Before I develop my main thesis, it will be 1 Reworked version of a paper originally presented at the International Conference on "Christianity and literature at the turn of the twentieth century" -Potchefstroom, August 1995.
2 Full-time professor in Department of English, Calvin College, Grand Rapids, USA.
helpful to clarify my use o f the term teleology. First, teleology does not require an A ristotelian conception o f an ideal or universal telos or end or goal. It does not even require that the telos be a certain or determ inate good. It does imply, however, that living in time entails some sense o f purposeful movement toward desired goals. As Jeffrey Stout (1988:237) writes in Ethics after Babel, the telos or end need not be "a fixed conception o f the good, derived once and for all from a philosophical view o f the hum an essence"; "the telos that matters is one actually achievable under our social-historical circumstances by acceptable m eans" (Stout, 1988:226) .
Second, teleology should not be identified with eschatology conceived of narrowly as a view or theory o f the the nature o f life and society in the "end tim es," that is, after the end history as hum an beings experience and know it. The C hristian belief in the "hereafter" does not provide in culturally specific terms the teleological goals o f human beings living in history. The nature of the "afterlife" is only obscurely suggested even in Scripture, and although the images o f heaven that are given in Scripture may be an important source for reflection on hum an life in the here and now, the images o f the hereafter provide no program m atic blueprints for constructing historical societies. Understood in a broader sense, however, as theological interpretation o f the moral and social im plications o f biblical teachings about the future, eschatology is close to, if not identical with, teleology. Conceived in this way, as, for example, in M oltm ann's Theology o f Hope, eschatology is o f great importance for C hristian understanding o f social and historical life. Moltmann (1967:16) writes, From first to last, and not merely in epilogue, Christianity is eschatology, is hope, forward looking and forward moving, and therefore also revolutionizing and transforming the present. The eschatological is not one element o f Christianity, but it is the medium of Christian faith as such, the key in which everything in it is s e t... Third, teleology is not to be confused with utopian thinking. As Paul Ricoeur (1986:16, 310-14) points out in his Lectures on ldeologr and Utopia, utopian reflection is an essential part o f our living in history. But while utopian visions or models o f ideal societies are useful and even necessary for teleological thinking, teleology encompasses much more than utopian projections. Utopian thinking imagines a future society that is relatively complete and coherent in its social institutions, whereas teleology pertains to any and every action in time, whether actual or imagined. As David C arr (1986:39) observes, "In a significant sense, when we are absorbed in an action the fo cu s or direction o f our attention, the center o f our concern, lies not in the present but in the future Every action has a goal w hether or not it projects or implies a utopian end. For Christian thinking in particular, it is important to distinguish the closely related concepts o f eschatology, utopia, and teleology. The Christian concept o f the afterlife offers no detailed program for a Christian utopia, and neither concept encompasses all o f the problems o f teleological thinking about the historically and culturally specific actions that daily engage all hum an beings.
Thus, the notion o f teleology that I want to use is a general and historicized one that is related to but not identical with the concepts o f eschatology and utopia. This use o f the term -the concern for future possibilities that attend all o f our actions -will draw our attention to the historical character o f hum an understanding, and that will enable us to see more clearly the scope and aim of literary criticism and the contours o f a Christian perspective on criticism. Our contemporary theoretical environment makes it necessary for Christian critics as well as other critics to acknowledge in new ways the temporal and historical contingencies o f hum an experience and understanding.
Truths and actions
Traditionally, Christian criticism has tended to concentrate on the importance o f transhistorical dimensions o f truth more than the historical limits o f under standing. W hen pressed to speak about the ultimate value o f literature, Christians tend to appeal to the notion o f universal truths that enrich life because these truths transcend historical limitations. Literature gains its enduring value from such truths, the argument goes, and thus great literature enables us to transcend our social and historical particularity. In contrast to this notion, I want to explore the view that the prim ary end o f literature is not the expression o f universal truths or the representation o f universal moral values. Though universal truths and values may be important for the study of literature, the prim ary purpose o f literature is not to convey or represent such truths or values but to explore the possibilities and consequences o f specific hum an actions and thoughts in a narrative situation. W hatever we may mean by universal truths and values in literature, they are qualities that serve the end o f literature and are not themselves the end. The end is the narration o f actions that have ethical significance. While we as readers cannot apprehend the ethical significance o f actions without cognitive analysis and understanding, the literature itself aims to explore by narrative means the moral dynamics of human action and does not have as its primary aim the direct statement o f the cognitive truths that may be implied by the narrative. Actions that are narrated in literature are often taken as illustrations o f universal truths and values rather than as what they are -the uncertain and often stumbling efforts o f characters to find a way to act in a confusing world. Literature dram atizes for us the teleological searching o f people who are faced with conflicts and choices. Even if a literary work in the end implies the affirmation o f some truth or value, the narrative focuses our interest on the dynamics o f the quest rather than on the implied truth or value. It is the teleological searching for meaning and direction more than the reaffirmation o f fam iliar universal values that interests us in literary narratives.
The question o f truth in the arts, however, is not one to pass over lightly. The notion that literature offers instruction as well as delight has continued to be an im portant topic in literary discussions since Plato and Aristotle placed it in the forefront o f literary theory. Instruction and delight have been defined and interpreted in many different ways, o f course, and in our century the concept o f instruction has become a particularly controversial one because o f increasing scepticism about w hether anyone can speak about truth in the traditional sense o f absolute rational certainty. In an era in which Cartesian doubt leads to more doubt rather than to certainty, what happens to definitions o f truth? Antifoundationalism has pretty much carried the day am ong contemporary philosophers and cultural theorists, and it has left us with new questions about the nature and significance o f truth. A nd if truth in philosophy has had a great fall, how can we speak o f truth in the arts and literature?
Perhaps Christians tend to be more persistent than others in clinging to traditional ideas about the importance o f truth in literature because concern about truth has always been so central in Christianity. After all, don't C hristians begin with the belief that Christianity is true? And if Christianity is true, does not everything else follow from that? Do twentieth-century Christians have to abandon their concern with truth because o f postmodern scepticism? I do not wish to obscure the importance o f truth claims for Christians, but I do wish to refocus the lenses, to see in a contemporaneous way how truth fits into the total enterprise o f literary criticism. If the concern with truth assists in our understanding o f literature but is not the primary end o f literary study, then we need to alter the angle o f vision appropriately.
My objection to putting truth at the centre o f our concerns or m aking universal truth the primary end o f literary criticism is that our conception o f truth as a universal or transhistorical standard tends to make us underestimate the historical nature o f understanding. A fully transhistorical stance is possible only for the deity; for hum an beings understanding is always conditioned by finite and historical limitations. The concept o f truth in literature is an im portant concept, but we must also take into account the conditions that history imposes on hum an understanding o f truth. A historicized conception o f teleology may help us to see these conditions more clearly.
Let me try to illustrate the implications o f this point with two examples, the first one taken from the realm o f ethics. If I take the commandment "Thou shalt not kill" and then on that basis alone condemn a person for killing another person, I am adopting a nonhistorical, nonteleological view o f moral value. I am not considering why the killing took place or for what purpose it was perpetrated. And if I judge in a purely abstract way that a given action is contrary to the law, I am also adopting a nonbiblical view, for the Bible often allows for killing even while it holds to the commandment forbidding killing. K illing in warfare, in capital punishment, and in self-defense are biblically condoned forms o f killing, and killing in these circumstances has generally been considered not to be contrary to the sixth commandment. Judgments about justifiable and unjustifiable killing can be discerned only if we take into account the context o f particular historical circumstances, and our under standing o f these circumstances cannot be made without the notion o f teleology.
A second example is more directly related to the issue o f truth as doctrine. The notion o f the sinfulness or fallenness o f hum an beings is one o f the cardinal truths o f Christianity. But it is also clear that this truth and its implications have been construed in diverse ways. In the Reformed tradition, for instance, much intellectual energy has been spent on questions about the consequences o f the fall: are all natural hum an actions totally sinful or partially sinful? Are hum an beings by nature totally incapable o f good or are they inclined to both good and evil? W hat is the relationship between sin and grace? Is there common grace as well as saving grace, and if so, to what extent does common grace affect the fallen nature o f hum an beings? The complexity o f the distinctions and argum ents over such issues often baffles the m inds o f nontheologians, particularly since advocates o f all positions claim to be explicating fundamental biblical truths. Difficulties in explaining doctrinal principles occur because such explanations are always made in response to particular historical and cultural issues that require interpretation. O ur under standing o f truth is coloured by the occasions that motivate our search for the truth and the ends for which we use it. O ur judgm ents are never divorced from pragm atic ends and consequences. Teleology places us in the thick o f our historical and cultural situations.
I f Christian interpretations o f truth, like all other interpretations, are influenced by historical and cultural situations, the relationship between literature and truth can be construed as an interactive one. We may look at literature in the light o f truth, but literature also may make us reexamine and even adjust or refine our understanding o f truth. And that complicates C hristian criticism and theory considerably. It forces Christians to abandon rationalistic Archimedean assumptions about truth and to adopt a more open and historically realistic stance. Truth is always in the process o f being interpreted, and while we do exam ine literature in the light o f our present understanding o f truth, we also seek to find in literature ways in which we can develop and enhance our understanding o f truth.
If we adopt this interactive model o f literature and truth, we also, I think, are better able to see that the aim o f literature is not first o f all to convey truth in the sense o f universal unchanging principles. Literature may imply or even give allegiance to certain universal truths or principles, but literature is essentially story; and since stories are made up o f actions, they aim to dramatize moral conflicts and choices rather than to convey universal truths. The focus of literature is on moral action more than on conceptual systems; literature focuses on ethics more than on truth claims. That is the primary thesis that I want to explore.
Teleology in contemporary literary theory: Derrida and Ricoeur
The need to rethink Christian literary criticism is in large part occasioned by current movements in literary theory. M uch o f the burden o f this theory is that literary criticism m ust be taken out o f the ivory tower and must address the issues o f authority and freedom, o f identity and community, o f race, class, and gender. From the viewpoint o f most contemporary critics, a literary criticism that focuses its attention on the search for universal truths and values is out o f touch with the cultural and intellectual crosscurrents o f our age. Behind much o f contemporary literary theory is a call for ethics, a call for the understanding o f the moral im plications o f reading. A C hristian approach to literature must also address social and moral issues. I f the ultimate goal is the living o f a Christian life, then C hristian critics will be concerned in the final analysis with ethical issues, ethical in the broad sense o f having to do with the nature and dynamics o f hum an actions. Their concern ultimately is with the question o f how literature affects or contributes to the goal o f Christian living. John Crowe Ransom (1991:476) put his finger on the pulse o f much o f mid-century thinking when he said that "Art is post-ethical" and that literary criticism should concern itself with aesthetic matters rather than ethical ones. The opposite is the case today: we need to rethink how aesthetic criticism contributes to our understanding o f broader ethical concerns.
The issues pertinent to ethical criticism are numerous, and I want to digress for a moment to acknowledge this complexity. Here are six interrelated issues that I glean primarily from the writings o f Stanley Hauerwas, a prominent American voice in the area o f Christian ethics. In Resident Aliens (1989) Hauerwas emphasizes the importance o f the biblical basis for Christian ethics, o f the need for stories that explore the issues o f life in narrative form, the nurturing influences o f a C hristian community, the need for a vital tradition, the beneficial effects o f exemplary models o f moral living, and finally a strong teleological view o f history. All o f these points would be im portant in a full Christian theory, but it is only the last o f these topics -teleology -that I am focusing on in this essay.
To see more flilly the implications o f teleological thinking for literary criticism, we will take a brief look at the viewpoints o f Jacques Derrida and Paul Ricoeur. Ricoeur's influence on literary criticism has not been as pervasive as Derrida's, but his views em body a strong alternative to Derrida's deconstructive criticism. Though I am concerned here with ends, I will examine what Derrida says about beginnings or origins because that will help us to understand what he implies about ends. 1 will also, at the risk o f oversimplifying his thinking, attem pt to put his ideas into less technical language than he uses.
For Derrida, language and m eaning are based on the principle o f difference. Only by distinguishing one word or concept from others can we arrive at understanding. Because o f this logical requirement o f thought and language, we can never discover a prior unity on which difference is based, for when we attem pt to do so we uncover concepts that we can understand only in term s o f their differences from other concepts. In our search for an originary unity from which differences arise, w e discover only more differences. In our metaphysical ponderings, we have a concept o f an ultimate origin as a unity prior to the emergence o f differences, but that concept o f an originary source o f meaning and difference fades forever from us into the infinite recesses o f thought. The ultimate origin o f thought is irrecoverable and therefore undefmable.
The source o f what is prior to m eaning and thought and language Derrida calls the trace, and the ultim ate origin he sometimes calls the archetrace. This archetrace, however, cannot be defined or described; it is the elusive origin prior to thought and language. Thus, while the trace is "the origin o f origin," it is also "the disappearance o f origin". Since the ultimate origin is unknowable, it is empty o f meaning; it is "nothing". The trace is a necessary logical concept, but we m ust also say that metaphysically speaking "there is no originary trace" (Derrida, 1976:61) . All metaphysical theories, according to Derrida, are efforts to give substance to the trace, but all such efforts are finally ineffectual: a metaphysical description o f the trace rem ains ultimately beyond the bounds o f thought and language.
W hat Derrida says about the concept o f origins applies equally to the concept of ends. Just as there is no archeology o f origins that leads to an ontology o f being, so there is no teleology o f ends that leads to an ontology o f being. We cannot know the ultim ate end o f thought or language just as we cannot know the ultim ate origin. Yet because the structure o f thought and m eaning is grounded in the structure o f time, o f the relation o f past, present, and future, we cannot escape the concern with origins and ends. The differences that make thought and language possible are temporal as well as spatial, and the temporal order therefore structures the possibilities o f thought. Thus, although the concepts o f origin and end which have shaped Western metaphysics are necessary concepts, all o f our efforts to understand them reveal our inability to give them substantive m eaning. O ur deep hum an need to seek out the origins and ends o f our thinking leads us only to the radical indeterminacy o f both the ultimate origin and the ultimate end. We live in the middle ground o f history, whose beginning and ending are beyond our knowing. ("In the Home Stretch")
The poem has a kind o f Derridean irony: in our philosophies we cannot know beginnings and ends but only middles. Yet we cannot escape our centuries-old quest to tease out some knowledge o f both origins and ends.
I will not pursue Derrida's arguments further than this. I want now simply to say that on the points that I have broached I think that Derrida is right. On these points Derrida's analysis should not be considered a threat to Christian thinking, for while Christianity celebrates the proclamation o f the Lamb who sits on the throne in Revelation: "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last" (Rev. 22:13), it does not claim to establish that message on the basis o f philosophical argumentation. Derrida's demonstration o f the limits o f language and the limits o f ontological argumentation does not undermine Christian theory but coincides with it. This is not to say that Derrida suddenly becomes a Christian apologist -that is far from the truth. It is simply to say that the biblical revelation o f the Lamb as Alpha and Omega is to be explicated from the starting point o f faith rather than o f reason. Christianity fills the concepts o f origin and end with the substance o f faith even while Enlightenm ent reason and Derridean theory empty them o f rationally grounded meaning.
But affirmations o f faith do need to be explained and interpreted and defended. In this task the work o f Paul Ricoeur provides what Charles Altieri (1990:28) calls a "contrastive strategy" to the strategy o f Derrida. Ricoeur attempts to establish a basis for ontological thinking by considering the importance o f ends (or teleology) for hermeneutical philosophy. In his essay "Existence and herm eneutics" Ricoeur posits three concerns or movements in a philosophy of interpretation. The first concern focuses on origins and on psychoanalytical analysis o f the archeology o f desire; the second concern focuses on ends or purposes and on phenomenological analysis o f the teleology o f the spirit; and the third concern focuses on signs o f the sacred and on the phenomenology of religion (Ricoeur, 1974:21) . It is the second o f these concerns -the teleological -that I will examine briefly.
Ricoeur assumes that an understanding o f teleology must be based on analysis o f texts and is not provided directly by authorial intention. Nor is our understanding o f a text to be based on our own a priori beliefs about the nature o f existence. Texts exist independently o f authors and readers; they are thus distantiated from a priori or originary assumptions about meaning. An under standing o f the teleology or purpose o f texts, therefore, depends on description and analysis o f what is available to us in the texts we scrutinize. In this process, comparative studies o f texts are im portant, for meanings are not self contained in single isolated texts. The m eaning o f a single isolated text can be determined only if we can interpret its relationships to things outside the text. M eaning and understanding are dependent on the hermeneutical process of interpreting these relationships. Now, Ricoeur argues, if we make a leap from analysis o f the teleology o f texts to reflections on the teleology o f all existence, we would require a comparable method. Thus, philosophical reflections on the end or purpose o f existence as a whole would require the interpreter (philosopher) to engage in comparative studies o f cultural life, for teleology "is constituted only in the movement o f interpretation, which understands one figure through another figure" (Ricoeur, 1974:22) . At the broadest level the understanding o f teleology would lead to a full-scale enterprise involving the interpretation o f all cultural texts. Ricoeur (1974:22) writes:
It is the task of this [philosophical] hermeneutics to show that existence arrives at expression, at meaning, and at reflection only through the continual exegesis of all the signification that comes to light in the world of culture. Existence becomes a self -human and adult -only by appropriating this meaning, which first resides 'outside', in works, institutions, and cultural monuments in which the life of the spirit is objectified.
Completing this global task o f interpretation is, o f course, impossible, but Ricoeur is suggesting that through comparative studies o f texts we at least have a m eans for significant reflection on origins and ends. If ultimate origins and ends elude the efforts o f speculative reason, they are nevertheless important concepts in the interpretation o f our literary and cultural texts.
W hereas Derrida wants to call into question all ontological descriptions o f existence by showing that language prevents us from resolving the differences in our views o f origins and ends, Ricoeur wants to take one step toward the development o f an ontology o f existence by arguing that our language nevertheless does enable us to reflect hermeneutically on our differences. He writes in "Creativity in language" : "The stategy o f metaphor [and we can add o f narrative fictions and myth, i.e., literature] is heuristic fiction for the sake o f redescribing reality. W ith metaphor we experience the metamorphosis o f both language and reality" (Ricoeur, 1978:133 ). Ricoeur's full argument about how teleological analyses contribute to a conception o f reality (or an ontology o f existence) is complex and is not necessary for my purpose. 1 give this glimpse into Ricoeur only to say that his alternative to postmodern skepticism offers a direction for C hristian thinking in a postmodern era and also suggests that reflections on teleology are an important part o f such thinking So much for the more abstract and philosophical contexts for our discussion of teleology. I return now to my effort to explore the implications o f these ideas for literary criticism. Christian thinking, I said earlier, is teleological but not utopian, for we cannot know what the distant future has in store and we cannot achieve an ideal social order. The fallenness (sinfulness) o f humanity is and always will be an inescapable condition o f hum an life in a Christian view of hum an history. It has become clear to most thinkers today that Christian theology gives no support to the Enlightenment idea o f progress that flourished in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Sander Griffioen (1987:27) asserts in his essay The Problem o f Progress that although we do need a theory of historical change and development, that theory must be freed from a false trust in the progress o f W estern culture. In all cultures, he observes, the opposition between good and evil (Jerusalem and Babylon) "is all-pervasive, so as to leave no room for cumulative progress". Christian teleology is not linked to the idea o f progress that emerged from an idealized view o f W estern culture in prior centuries but to a set o f ethical norms and beliefs that serve to guide Christian believers in their unending struggle against evil. Christianity holds implicitly to an open-ended view o f history. It is intent on exploring possibilities o f living in a world that is historically indeterminate, that is to say, indeterminate in the sense that the future cannot be known and in the sense that a definitive model for social and historical life cannot be detailed as a specific and realizable goal. W hat Christianity offers in this voyage into the unknown future is the guidance o f a tradition and a coherent set o f principles, principles that serve as directional signs both theoretically and practically. 
Teleology and story
In order to explore these differences, I would like to turn our attention now more specifically to the nature o f stories. Stories are necessarily teleological. They begin with a situation within which characters must act. And since action moves forward in time, stories, in Frank Kermode's happy phrase, "educe the forms o f a future " (1982:83) . There is in every story a sense o f an ending, a point toward which the action o f the story moves. In a good su r the ending seems to be inevitable, not in the sense that only one ending is possible but in the sense that the actions o f the story emerge credibly from preceding actions. Stories, in other words, explore possibilities o f action. At any point the action could go in several ways, though every action necessarily cuts off some o f the possiblities for future actions. Every action both closes some possibilities and opens others. As a story grows, we want actions to grow believeably out o f previous actions and situations, and we want new actions to fall within the range o f believeable actions. And this pattern is the pattern o f teleology: a sequencing o f actions such that the story "educes the forms o f a future" in a way that is credible. At any point the ending may not be determinate or predictable or knowable, but it must fall w ithin the pattern that previous actions have established.
In all stories open-endedness and teleology are companions.
I want now to insist a little more strongly that a C hristian view o f history is teleological in the sense that I am trying to clarify. I like to think o f history as an exploration o f possibilities. It is sometimes suggested that Christians can be confident about w hatever happens because they know how history will end, namely with the second coming o f Christ and the beginning o f a new heaven and a new earth. But the term end is ambivalent here. We speak o f end as conclusion and end as purpose, and these two m eanings do not always coincide. One concerned with the "doctrine o f the last things" would use the term end in the sense o f conclusion whereas one concerned with teleology in general would use the term end in the sense o f purpose. The second coming may be seen as the conclusion o f history, but it need not be thought o f as the purpose o f history. In a certain theological sense, o f course, the eschaton might be seen as the purpose o f history, that is to say, the purpose o f history is the final restoration o f the creation order. But if we conflate eschatology (in the narrow sense) and teleology (in the sense o f conclusion and purpose) and then as a consequence view the historical quest for a C hristian life and society as a quest to emulate or realize the conditions o f the "life hereafter", we create the possibility for a kind o f escapism from history, a looking beyond to something that cannot happen in the here and now. In a Christian view, historical life can never achieve the equivalent o f the "life hereafter", and our need for historical realism, therefore, should not be obscured by a Christian idealism that places undue emphasis on the life hereafter.
If we use the term purpose in a more realistic and specific way to refer to hum an intentions and actions, then the purpose o f history m ust be understood This teleological view o f history, we may now say, conceives o f history as a story -as the story that men and women create as they explore the possibilities o f action in a world that God has made for them. The structure o f history is the structure o f a story. The difference between history and the stories we tell is that the story o f history is always in process, never finished. It is a story therefore whose final ending in a teleological sense is not and cannot be known. We have a "sense o f an ending" and we have a long sequence o f previous actions to think about, but we do not know specifically what the state o f human life will be like before the eschaton. A s a m atter o f fact we cannot even project very far into the future.
O f course, we do try to see as far as we can into the future. As we live out the story o f history, we "educe the forms o f a ftiture" according to our best judgm ents. We envision possibilities o f action, and our living is an exploration o f these possibilities. But we are left with exploration rather than certainty about historical possibilities. Christians can see into the immediate future no better than anyone else; they only look at histoiy through different glasses, as John Calvin intim ates (1949 Calvin intim ates ( [ 1559 :80).
W hile this view o f teleology and history may seem less than confident about Christian action and judgm ent in the world, it is I believe a vigorous and hopeful application o f the doctrine o f creation. It infuses into this doctrine the energy o f discovery and exploration and creativity; it welcomes participation in the cultures o f the world rather than denial or escape; it encourages us to continually create and explore new stories rather than to live as sardonic jurors or prosecutors o f all stories other than our own. To explore the creation is to explore the possibilities that God has placed within the creation order, and to explore these possibilities is to explore the infinite ways for relating to and finding fellowship with the God o f creation. If in creation God reveals him self and communes with his people, then all o f history will not be long enough to exhaust the possiblities for knowing this God through his creation. The finite can never exhaust the infinite. Thus, the open-endedness o f history is not a threat to Christian thinking; rather, it offers the opportunity to explore without end the world God gives us.
Unfortunately hum an beings after the fall are inclined to explore all o f the dark and evil possibilities as well as the possibilities for light and goodness, and these explorations are the material o f literature as well as o f life. We learn from stories that explore the evils within our fallen and depraved selves and within the fallen creation as well as from the stories that envision the possibilities o f goodness. But in spite o f the potential for evil in life and literature, the open-endedness o f history may be regarded first and foremost for C hristians as an invitation to explore the inexhaustible wonders o f God and his creation.
How do stories contribute to this end? In a story we envision a situation in which characters act, and in following a course o f action we are in effect considering the plausibility and desirability o f the characters' choices. Stories imagine, or project, ways o f acting in given situations. As Wayne Booth (1988:71) writes in The Company We Keep, "Every appraisal o f narrative is implicitly a comparison between the always complex experience we have had in its presence and what we have known before". We are drawn to stories because they enable us to reflect on possibilities o f action, and we respond to them favourably when they open up for us new ways o f im agining and thinking about hum an action. The value o f stories (literature) is in the final analysis that they help us to reflect on possible directions for our own actions in our own historical stories.
Telling stories in literature is but a sophisticated, complex, and aesthetically pleasing way o f doing what we all do throughout our lives. As C arr (1986:61) writes:
The actions and sufferings of life can be viewed as a process of telling ourselves stories, listening to those stories, and acting them out or living them through. And here I am thinking only of living one's own life, quite apart from the social dimension, both cooperative and antagonistic, of our action, which is even more obviously intertwined with narration.
Our communications with one another consist primarily o f the stories we tell, whether they narrate actual, imagined, or dreamed events, or whether they interpret past events. Often we tell the same story in different ways (as in a court o f law) so that we can decide what to think or what to do about given situations. But more often perhaps we store up the stories we hear so that when certain situations arise we can recall the stories and use them as guides for the decisions or actions we need to take. W hen it is time to act, we refer to the stories we have heard. How do I change a flat tire? How do I apply for a passport? W hat is the best way to catch rainbow trout? Almost all o f our actions are guided by our memory o f stories we have heard. And if we are uncertain about w hat to do, we go out looking for stories from people who have gone through the same circumstances or have performed sim ilar actions. W hat is the best way to travel from the U.S. to South Africa? W hat is it like for an American to spend time at an Afrikaans-speaking university? Through hearing the stories o f others, we envision possibilities for our own lives; from these stories we "educe the forms for a future".
The stories that we call literature are not, to be sure, as immediately practical as the ordinary stories o f everyday life, but their purpose and value are fundamentally the same. The teleology implicit in stories helps us to deal with the teleology o f our own lives, not in a prescriptive way and perhaps not in ways that are characterized by immediate application and finality. But our actions and questions range from the immediacy o f traveling to a new place to the broad issues o f relating to other people, to nature, and to God. Somewhere in the range o f these actions and questions stories speak to us, offering possibilities for thinking and acting in our own situations. Consciously or not, we are in effect asking the following question: Given these stories, what are the possible and desirable ways o f acting in similar situations?
The stories we tell and hear do not, o f course, "move" us to action in the way that Sir Philip Sidney believed (1991:123) . That assumption is the basic fallacy o f Sidney's position. If stories really did compel or determine actions, then, like Sidney, we would have to be very much concerned about developing and praising only those stories that promote virtue. But stories offer possibilities, not directives. Through the telling o f stories we envision possibilities for action, and through the comparisons we make am ong stories we gain insight into our own stories.
If we think about stories in this way, a way that brings together the teleology of stories and the teleology o f our own lives in history, a way o f viewing the ethics o f literary study is evident. The end o f literature is not the discovery of universal moral truths and values; it is the exploration o f possible ways o f acting in historically specific situations.
Implications for Christian literary theory
The im plications o f this view need to be drawn out a bit further for a Christian theory o f literature. And so I conclude with three points. Second, if stories serve the ends that I have been discussing, then it is important for a C hristian critic to think religiously about stories and, even more strongly, to let religious thinking be the basis for literary judgm ents. If stories grow out o f experiences in real life and if they serve the purpose o f "educing the forms o f a future", they are contained within the larger story o f history. At the end o f his novel A ll the K in g ' s M en, Robert Penn W arren (1959:438) writes that Jack Burden and Anne Stanton, now m arried, go "out o f history into history and the awful responsibility o f Tim e". The burden o f all stories is that they create situations and characters out o f the m aterials o f life (history) and project possibilities for acting that are relevant to our own exploration o f life. The study and evaluation o f literature cannot at its most significant point be separated from the responsibilities o f time. And since for the C hristian critic the perspective on history and the responsibilities o f time are profoundly religious, the ultimate framework for literary understanding, too, is the religious perspective o f C hristian faith. Even though propositional truth may not be the primary end o f literature, Christian literary critics need to be religiously and theologically astute, since the religious story is the large story of history within which our smaller stories occur. As Hans Frei (1974:130) argues, our stories must fit into the world that the Bible describes. The way we interpret our sm aller stories is dependent on how we interpret the larger one. The sm aller stories also o f course influence how we think about the larger one, but it is still the case that w e do not understand our smaller literary stories apart from our understanding o f the larger religious one. A Christian criticism that is principial and internally coherent needs a theory that accounts for the relationship o f literature to life; and that points, among other things, to the need to rethink the nature and implications o f teleology as a historical and ethical concept. The need is for an ethical criticism that is based on a teleological understanding o f historical life. The challenge for Christian critics is to acknowledge the contributions o f postmodern thinkers to the philosophical debates about time and history, language and rationality, truth and ethics, while at the same time m aintaining the coherence o f a historical Christianity. To do that may require a refurbished understanding o f history and ethics and an exploration o f how that understanding can refocus the aims of Christian literary criticism.
